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Based on a sample of office markets in 33 cities across 16 countries for the period 2007-2015, 
this paper explores variations in commercial real estate transaction activity and asset pricing in 
international office markets. It is argued that there are complex interactions and feedback 
relationships between asset prices, transaction activity, market conditions and local institutional 
structures in real estate markets. Commercial real estate pricing is modelled using data on 
capitalization rates. The relationships found are consistent with previous research in terms of 
the importance of drivers such as government bond yields, yield spreads and real estate rents. 
Consistent with information network effects, it is also found that larger and more mature 
markets tend to have lower cap rates and, thus, higher asset prices. The results for transaction 
activity are less clear cut. Results from econometric analysis of turnover rates suggest that the 
same explanatory factors do not determine transaction activity to the same extent as cap rates. 
When purged of possible joint determinants, there is no evidence to support the view that cap 







As institutional real estate investment is becoming progressively more globalized, there has been 
growing interest in understanding the determinants of comparative pricing and risks in international real 
estate markets.  Although there is a substantial literature on international real estate investment, to date, 
the majority of empirical research in commercial real estate on modelling pricing, transaction activity 
and their interrelationship has focussed on the US.   Based on a sample of 33 cities across 16 nations, 
this paper explores variations in transaction activity and pricing in international office markets.  Owing 
to potential problems of endogeneity in the relationship between prices and transaction activity, a range 
of models are used to investigate the determinants of transaction activity, capitalization rates and the 
dynamic relationship between them across global real estate markets.          
 
Background and context 
 
In real estate and in other major asset classes, measures of transaction activity are often the simplest 
and most widely available proxies for liquidity.  When assessing market conditions, reduced transaction 
activity is often discussed interchangeably with reduced liquidity.  At its core, the liquidity of an asset 
is the relative ability to be able to immediately exchange it for cash at prevailing prices without cost 
and vice versa in terms of ability to purchase assets.  Hence, three core aspects of liquidity are time-to-
transact, cost-to-transact and certainty of market price.  One consequence of reduced liquidity (through, 
say, longer transaction times or higher costs) is reduced transaction activity.  However, transaction 
activity is not a perfect proxy for liquidity. For example, when the marginal investors have long-term 
horizons, it is possible for low transaction activity to co-exist with high asset liquidity.1  
 
Fisher et al (2004) identified two stylized facts regarding transaction activity.  First, it fluctuates 
considerably from period to period and from market to market. Second, it is positively correlated with 
                                                          
1 See Collett, Lizieri and Ward  (2003) for examples in regard to real estate markets. 
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changes in asset prices, i.e. transaction activity is typically higher when prices are relatively high and/or 
rising, and lower when prices are relatively low and/or falling.  Changes in transaction activity are 
explained as a function of changes in buyers’ and sellers’ reservation prices and of potential differences 
in the timing of these changes.  Following Fisher et al, Clayton, MacKinnon and Peng (2008) propose 
that changes in sellers’ estimates of asset values lag changes in buyers’ estimates. For transaction 
activity to be pro-cyclical with prices, buyers must respond more rapidly than sellers in updating asset 
value estimates. Clayton et al propose a ‘sticky’ valuation model to explain this phenomenon. They 
argue that in a low transaction (low liquidity) environment, sellers are faced with a lack of new 
information with which to update prior valuations and hence place considerable weight on old and 
potentially stale information, causing reservation prices to be high relative to bids. A range of other 
factors that may affect deviations between buyer and seller valuations such as disposition bias, pro-
cyclical credit markets, clientele effects and option values are also identified. 
 
Nevertheless, there is long-standing skepticism as to whether any causal relationship exists between 
pricing and transaction activity.  Positive correlations between transaction activity and price changes 
may be due to common determinants.  Changes in ‘fundamentals’ such as macro-economic and capital 
market performance, and debt availability, have been associated with price shifts over time and they 
may also be significant determinants of transaction activity.  As a result, changes in market conditions 
are reflected by changes in both prices and transaction activity.   
 
A significant factor affecting transaction activity may be market size. Several studies in the US have 
demonstrated a tendency for institutional real estate investment to concentrate in the largest metro areas. 
Smith, Hess and Liang (2014) found that the top five markets accounted for 21% of the population, but 
over 45% of assets in the NCREIF index.2  For 2001-13, McAllister and Nanda (2015) found that New 
York, Washington, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Atlanta and Houston accounted for 
                                                          
2 NCREIF stands for National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries and this organisation compiles 
indexes of private commercial real estate performance based on US institutional real estate investments. 
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nearly 70% of transaction volume by value.  This increased to 85% for foreign investors who would be 
expected to have higher search costs and larger markets typically have higher levels of (foreign) investor 
recognition.  In a sample of 28 major European cities, McAllister and Nanda (2016) found that London 
alone accounted for more than 50% of transaction volume.  Such Merton-type investor recognition 
effects can stimulate informational cascades and network effects generating geographical concentration 
of assets, investors, intermediaries and information that can, in turn, reinforce clustering of transaction 
activity (Merton, 1987). 
 
Studies investigating the short-term dynamic effects of transaction activity on prices and vice versa 
are relevant in this context.  Fisher, Ling and Naranjo (2009) examine whether net capital flows from 
institutional to non-institutional investors impact upon asset returns for US commercial real estate. 
They find some evidence that institutional capital flows have a statistically and economically 
significant association with subsequent returns at the aggregate US level, but the results are not 
consistent across sectors or CBSAs. Applying a similar methodology to the UK market, Ling, Marcato 
and McAlllister (2009) did not find any evidence to support a ‘price pressure effect’ of transaction 
activity on prices.  Beyond commercial real estate, similar findings have been reported by both Stein 
(1995) and Cauley and Pavlov (2002), who focus on US housing markets.  Here, volumes tend to fall 
when house prices are falling and vice versa. These and other studies in the residential sector suggest 
a contemporaneous and self-reinforcing relationship between prices and transaction activity that is 
generated by exogenous demand shocks.  
 
It is notable that the body of academic work on the determinants of cap rates does not focus on the 
potential effect of transaction activity (see Sivitanidou and Sivitanides, 1999; Ambrose and Nourse, 
1993; Chen, Hudson-Wilson and Nordby, 2004; Chervachidze, Costello and Wheaton, 2009, 
Chervachidze and Wheaton, 2013). Only Clayton, Ling and Naranjo (2009) use capital flows as an input 
into a composite investor sentiment index, but they find no consistent role for sentiment in explaining 




Furthermore, there has been little previous research investigating the determinants of cap rates at an 
international scale.  One exception is D’Argensio and Laurin (2009).  They modelled determinants of 
office cap rates for a panel of 52 developed and developing countries between 2000 and 2006.  Similar 
to recent US studies (McAllister and Nanda, 2015; Chervachidze and Wheaton, 2013), they found a 
strong positive relationship between government bond rates and office cap rates, as expected, but they 
found inconsistent results for relationships with various proxies of expected rental growth.  Meanwhile, 
McAllister and Nanda (2016) investigated the determinants of European office market cap rates, 
drawing upon data for 28 European cities over 1999-2013.  They found that the real risk-free rate 
coefficient has the expected positive sign and was statistically significant.  Consistent with adaptive or 
myopic expectations, the real rent ratio had a statistically significant negative sign.  They also found a 
statistically significant positive coefficient for country risk (measured as the difference between the 
yield on US government bonds and local government bonds) on cap rates.  In a study of the impact of 
international investors on cap rates, Oikarinen and Falkenbach (2017) found expected positive 
relationships between cap rates and bond yields and vacancy rates.      
 
There has been much less empirical work on the determinants of transaction activity in commercial real 
estate markets.  Devaney, McAllister and Nanda (2017a) used data on trading volumes and turnover 
rates for 49 US MSA office markets and employed panel models to test which factors led to higher or 
lower turnover over the period 2001-15.  They found that turnover rates were positively related to 
market size and economic growth rates, while a negative relationship with vacancy rates supported the 
observations of prior research that trading is pro-cyclical with regard to real estate market conditions. 
A negative coefficient for the spread between corporate and government bond yields suggested that 
trading activity was sensitive to changes in risk.  Finally, turnover rates were lower in office markets 
where transfer taxes (often the largest direct transaction cost) were higher. 
 
Lieser and Groh (2014) modelled commercial real estate transaction volumes across 47 national real 
estate markets, with most of this modelling carried out on data spanning the period 2004-09.  Building 
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upon earlier work (see Lieser and Groh, 2011), they gathered data on a large number of indicators 
including measures of economic and market activity, capital markets, legal and regulatory factors, and 
the wider social and political environment.  The dependent variable in this work appears to be total 
transaction volume per year, including domestic and international real estate investor activity.  Lieser 
and Groh regressed data on transaction volumes on individual variables and composite indicators for 
the factors listed above.  Their results reveal volumes to be driven by the size of real estate markets, the 
depth of capital markets and the legal and regulatory environment.  Although their work draws attention 
to a wide range of data sources capturing economic activity and the investment environment, there are 
some issues.  Mauck and Price (2017) note that a major concern is the mismatch between the conceptual 
framework (on cross-border activity) and the nature of the variable being modelled (total transaction 
activity).  Another issue is the omission of any variables relating to real estate market conditions in the 
countries concerned. 
 
Devaney, McAllister and Nanda (2017b) examined the determinants of transaction activity in 38 
national markets in Europe and Asia-Pacific over the period 2000-14 at the all property level and for 
the office sector. They found that the size and wealth of a country, the risk associated with that country 
and the performance of its commercial real estate market are significant factors that explain the level of 
transaction activity.  In contrast to their earlier findings for US cities, they found that turnover tends to 
decrease as market size increases. 
 
As discussed above, whilst the relationship between pricing and transaction activity is theoretically 
uncertain, they tend to be closely related.  In line with the analysis above, a real estate market’s level of 
transaction activity is expected to be positively related to real estate investment performance and vice 
versa. Investment performance and transaction activity are then expected to be determined by a range 
of real estate market, economic and capital market variables. Many of these determining factors will 
vary between markets and submarkets at any given point in time.  There are significant methodological 
challenges in attempting to investigate the relationships between pricing and transaction activity, and 
in trying to model the determinants of each variable.  Causal relationships between the determinants of 
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transaction activity (and the determinants of the determinants) tend to be complex due to the presence 
of direct and indirect effects, mediated and moderated interactions, and bi-directional and feedback 
relationships.  Consequently, empirical investigation is hindered by endogeneity issues.  Bearing such 
issues in mind, we present the results of a study on patterns and determinants of pricing and transaction 
activity in major office markets at a global scale. 
 
Data and Summary Statistics 
 
The sample of 33 cities used in this study is drawn from a selection of 16 developed and emerging 
countries that were chosen to provide a broad coverage of international real estate markets.  A list of 
the cities, together with basic descriptive statistics, is provided in Appendix A.  For comparability, rents 
and values are displayed in US dollar terms but a local currency basis is used for the econometric 
analysis to avoid potential exchange rate distortions.  Sixteen cities are in Europe, incorporating a range 
of developed and emerging real estate markets.  Six US ‘gateway’ cities are also included, while three 
Chinese cities are selected: Hong Kong, Beijing and Shanghai.  The Japanese markets of Tokyo and 
Osaka, along with Seoul and Singapore, complete the sample from Asia, and Sydney and Melbourne 
represent Australia.  Perhaps the most notable omission is the lack of any African or South American 
cities.  This reflects the uneven availability of data across global real estate markets. 
 
The data used in the study were drawn from a range of sources.  The real estate market indicators used 
were provided by CBRE, who are the largest global commercial real estate services firm.3 The market 
indicators include the cap rate and rent (in local currency terms) for the office market in each city, and 
estimates of the size of the office stock. Most of the data was provided at a quarterly frequency from 
Q1 2007 through to Q2 2015.  Cap rates are reported as per local market convention, which means there 
are some differences in how they are calculated across cities. Any consistent differences, such as one 
                                                          
3 Tokyo and Osaka are exceptions where rents and stock were sourced from CBRE, but cap rates were sourced 




market reporting cap rates on a gross basis and another reporting them as net, should be accounted for 
through the use of fixed effects in the econometric models.    
 
The transaction activity measures that we use are derived from data supplied to us by Real Capital 
Analytics (RCA).  RCA tracks transactions of commercial real estate above a threshold of $10 million 
for all major real estate markets around the world.  For each city, RCA supplied quarterly data on the 
number of office transactions, the value of those transactions in local currency terms and the amount of 
floorspace traded.  We then measured turnover rates in two different ways.  First, we measured the 
proportion of floorspace traded relative to the size of the office stock in floorspace terms, using the 
CBRE figures for the latter.  Second, we measured the value of floorspace traded relative to an estimate 
of the value of the office stock each period in each city.4  Neither measure is likely to be a perfect 
indicator of turnover in each market, but deriving two different measures allows us to check our findings 
in the absence of an established approach. 
 
Finally, we collected economic variables of relevance to commercial real estate pricing. Our proxy for 
the nominal risk-free rate is the yield on ten-year government bonds. This does not reflect a true risk- 
free investment in many cases, as bonds issued by some governments might be at risk of default and so 
incorporate a premium for country sovereign risk (D’Argensio and Laurin, 2009). Therefore, we take 
the US ten-year government bond yield as a risk-free rate in our modelling and use the spread between 
local and US government bond yields as a measure of country risk that varies through time and between 
countries.  In line with Chervachidze and Wheaton (2013), we also incorporate a proxy for credit market 
conditions using the change in the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, sourced from the World Bank.   
 
                                                          
4 Value estimates for total floorspace were calculated as follows.  For each quarter, we compared prime capital 
value per square metre based on CBRE rents and cap rates with the average price per square metre from 
transactions monitored by RCA. The former were too high to produce convincing estimates of stock value while 
the latter varied too much from period to period. Hence, we computed the ratio of the average and prime figures 
in each period and used the average value of this ratio as a scaling factor to adjust the prime capital value per 
square metre figures. 
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The study period begins in Q1 2007 and ends in Q2 2015.  In Figure 1, the value of office transactions 
over this period for all the cities in the sample is shown in US dollar terms.  The start of this period 
marked the peak of the commercial real estate market in many countries.  This peak was followed by a 
sustained downturn in both values and real estate market activity, driven by the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) in 2008-09.  The average of the prime office cap rates for the sample of cities rose from around 
5.5% during 2007 to a high of 6.9% by Q1 2009.5 After this, most markets experienced some recovery 
in economic conditions, although the extent and speed of recovery varied.  From mid-2009 onwards, 
falling cap rates and rising transaction volumes can be observed.  In fact, prime office cap rates fell to 
their pre-crisis levels by mid-2011 and fell further after this, while transaction volumes recovered to 
around $65 billion by Q4 2014.6 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Whilst Figure 1 indicates a strong correspondence between volumes and cap rates at the aggregate level, 
this does not demonstrate that one causes the other, as patterns in both could reflect other fundamental 
factors. Furthermore, patterns for the sample as a whole might not represent the experiences of 
individual locations. Figure 1 also indicates that there is seasonality in the data at a quarterly frequency.  
From 2009 onwards, there tends to be spikes in transaction activity at the end of each calendar year. 
This is not unexpected as institutional investors, in particular, may push to complete transactions within 
the typical calendar-year performance measurement period.  This is accounted for in models of turnover 
rates through the incorporation of seasonal dummy variables. 
 
Figure 2 shows the average turnover rate for all cities in the sample across the study period.  As noted 
above, the turnover rates are computed in two different ways. The patterns shown by each set of rates 
are consistent with each other and are broadly similar to the patterns in volumes shown by Figure 1. 
                                                          
5 The average prime office cap rate in Figure 1 is calculated without the six US cities where cap rates were only available 
biannually. 
6 Cash volumes themselves will be affected by changing values, but the patterns described here are very similar if the total 
amount of floorspace traded is graphed in place of the total value of assets traded each quarter. 
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However, turnover rates do not rise as markedly as transaction volumes in the latter half of the sample 
period. This is due to the fact that that the increase in volumes during the latter years of the period was 
partly driven by rising prices and not simply by activity levels. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Table 1 presents the average turnover rates on a city-by-city basis. Although the underlying calculations 
are performed at a quarterly frequency, we present annualised numbers for ease of reference. In terms 
of turnover rate based on value, we estimate that the average is 2.2% per quarter across the sample of 
cities studied, equating to approximately 9.0% per annum. However, there is a lot of variation around 
this average.  For all cities, apart from Hong Kong, Osaka and St Petersburg, the estimated turnover 
rates for value of assets transacted are higher than for floorspace transacted. This is consistent with 
higher value offices experiencing higher turnover levels. Nonetheless, the differences between the 
measures are usually small, with Chicago and San Francisco being the main exceptions. The rankings 
of transaction activity that are produced from the two sets of turnover rates are also very similar. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Cities with the lowest turnover rates in Table 1 are a mixed group.  Emerging real estate markets such 
as Istanbul and Moscow have higher turnover rates than several cities in developed economies such as 
Barcelona, Paris, Tokyo, Munich and Hong Kong.  It is hard to discern any notable patterns among the 
markets with low turnover rates.  However, there are clearer patterns for the locations with high turnover 
rates, which are dominated by cities in the US, Australia, UK and, perhaps surprisingly, China. 
 
Many markets that might be regarded as relatively liquid by investors have below average turnover 
rates. In some cases, this may be because such cities are regarded by major investors as core markets 
and so are more likely to be long-term holds in portfolios. In turn, second or third tier cities may be 
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regarded as ‘cycle’ or ‘rotational’ plays. In the US, it has been found that Sun Belt cities such as Phoenix 
and Las Vegas have had higher turnover rates than so-called Gateway cities such as New York, 
Washington and Los Angeles (see Devaney, McAllister and Nanda, 2017a). This reinforces the need to 
distinguish between liquidity and transaction activity. Markets like Hong Kong, Tokyo, Munich and 
New York might have low turnover rates because owners do not wish to sell rather than because they 
are unable to sell.  Indeed, in such markets the liquidity problem is often for buyers who find it difficult 
to source suitable stock. 
 
A simple scatter graph illustrating the relationship between cap rates and transaction activity is 
displayed in Figure 3.  At this stage, this comparison does not control for differences between cities in 
factors such as risk or rental growth prospects.  Nonetheless, from this graph, there appears to be no 
correspondence between turnover rates and cap rates.  This is so regardless of whether value-based or 
floorspace-based turnover rates are graphed.  Some markets with low turnover rates have high cap rates 
(such as St Petersburg and Sofia), while others with low turnover rates have low cap rates (for example, 
Tokyo and Hong Kong).  
 
Econometric Estimation Strategy 
Our empirical starting point is the well-established literature on modelling cap rates (see Sivitanides et 
al, 2001; Hendershott and MacGregor, 2005a, 2005b; Chichernea et al, 2008; Archer and Ling 1997; 
Chervachidze, Costello and Wheaton, 2009; Chervachidze and Wheaton, 2013; Nanda and Tiwari, 
2013; McAllister and Nanda 2015). Standard models of cap rates are founded upon the Gordon Growth 
Model as follows: 
 
Cap rate = Required return – Income growth  
 
Where the required return is a function of the risk-free rate plus a risk premium.  The nominal risk-free 
rate is composed of the real rate of return plus a rate reflecting inflation expectations.  It is typically 
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proxied by government bond yields.  Income growth is the expected increase in cash flows through time 
associated with the investment.  In previous research, a range of variables have been used to proxy risk 
premiums and income growth expectations - the term structure of interest rates, the spread between 
corporate and government bond yields, the reported risk premium demanded by investors, availability 
of credit and market-specific real estate fundamentals such as rental growth rates and real rent levels.  
Following the basic model outlined in the literature, the empirical model used here takes the following 
form:  
 
𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡    (1) 
 
where kijt is the cap rate in city i in country j at time t, RFRjt is the US risk-free rate and Riskprjt is 
country j’s risk premium at time t, defined as the difference between the country’s government bond 
yield and US government bond yield.  As noted earlier, we include the change in domestic credit as a 
proportion of GDP (Debt flow) as an explanatory variable.  Chervachidze and Wheaton (2013) note that 
the expected sign of the Debt Flow variable is ambiguous.  A positive sign may indicate potential 
financial instability and a negative sign may indicate less severe lending constraints.   
 
RentDevijt is the deviation from the long-run trend in real rent in city i in country j at time t.  The real 
rent deviation represents the difference between the log of real rent in that city and the predicted log of 
real rent based on a simple linear trend.  Therefore, it is derived from a regression of (logged) real rent 
on time.  This follows the approach taken by Hendershott and MacGregor (2005a) and acts as a 
portmanteau variable assumed to capture several attributes of local office market dynamics.  For 
example, the real rent level may deviate from its long-run trend in a positive direction during the 
expansionary phase of the business cycle.  If investors exhibit forward-looking expectations, higher 
levels of real rent than suggested by historical trends could signal a forthcoming downward correction 
in the market.  However, it is conceivable that investors may form adaptive expectations and interpret 
a deviation from long-run trend as a signal of continued positive future performance (Chervachidze and 
Wheaton, 2013), although arguably this might not be rational. μij denotes city fixed effects.  Finally,  εijt 
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is a time-variant unobservable that is assumed to be randomly distributed and uncorrelated with the 
observed controls.   
 
The turnover models take a similar form with common determinants as in Equation (1): 
 
𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿0 +  𝜃1𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡    (2) 
 
where Tijt is the turnover rate in city i in country j at time t.  We also test models without explicitly 
specifying fixed effects, but including institutional indicators such as market transparency scores (as 
measured by JLL’s Global Real Estate Transparency Index) and size of the local office market instead.  
Seasonal dummies (quarterly or half yearly) are included in all turnover models to address potential 
seasonality issues.  We have also performed unit root tests for all time-varying determinants to check 
for stationarity.  These indicate that all variables are stationary.  All models are estimated using robust 
standard errors to address potential biases due to heteroscedasticity. 
 
Given the well-known endogeneity issues associated with investigating the relationship between prices 
and transaction activity, we apply a two-stage orthogonalization procedure to first identify the element 
of transaction activity or cap rate not explained by market fundamentals.  The unexplained (by market 
fundamentals) variance or residual error from these models then represents the component of 
transaction activity or cap rate that is not jointly determined.  We then re-estimate the cap rate (turnover 
rate) model above, adding the residual errors from the initial turnover rate (cap rate) model as a further 
explanatory variable.  This is to test whether the residual element of turnover rate (cap rate) is also a 
significant explanatory variable for cap rate (turnover rate).  We lag the residuals by one period to try 






The results of the econometric estimations are presented in Tables 2 and 3.  In Table 2, four model 
specifications are presented that estimate the determinants of cap rates. Models 1 and 3 incorporate city 
fixed effects whilst Models 2 and 4 introduce explanatory variables in place of fixed effects that may 
explicitly identify the drivers of cross-sectional differences in cap rates embedded in the city fixed 
effects.  With an adjusted R-squared of 87%-88%, the explanatory power of the fixed effects models is 
high.  The omission of city fixed effects reduces the explanatory power of the models to 64%-66%.   
 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
In all models, the coefficient for US risk-free rate has the expected positive sign and is statistically 
significant.  The country risk premium is positive and statistically significant.  As the required return 
on government bonds relative to US government bonds increases, the cap rate is higher.  The change in 
debt outstanding as a proportion of GDP has a negative effect on cap rates.  This is in line with 
Chervachidze and Wheaton (2013) who found a negative impact on US cap rates from the change in 
total debt outstanding as a proportion of GDP.  Previous analysis has acknowledged potentially 
contrasting expectations regarding the sign of this variable, with macroeconomic theory proposing that 
high debt availability signalled possible financial instability and microeconomic theory suggesting that 
easy credit conditions raise asset prices.  At the international level, our finding is that, all else equal, 
increases in debt levels are associated with higher asset prices and lower cap rates.   
 
The real rent deviation variable has a statistically significant negative sign.  This indicates that cap rates 
are lower where real rents are above their long-term trend.  This finding is also in line with most previous 
research and is consistent with adaptive expectations by investors (see Chervachidze et al, 2009, 
Chervachidze and Wheaton, 2013, McAllister and Nanda, 2016, Hendershott and MacGregor, 2005b).  
When the lagged transaction activity variable is added to the model specification, there are negligible 
changes to the coefficients and to the explanatory power of the models.  The coefficient for this variable 
is not statistically significant.  This suggests that, when purged of possible joint determinants, 




Models 2 and 4 omit city fixed effects and include city and national market-attributes in the estimation.  
In terms of these variables, the coefficient for market size is significant and negative.  This is consistent 
with larger cities having lower cap rates.  It is in line with the degree of concentration of investment, 
investors and intermediaries in ‘core’ markets having an influence on pricing.  Further, given that the 
least transparent markets tend to have the highest scores, the JLL Transparency Score has the expected 
positive effect on cap rates.  To be clear, the coefficient on the JLL Transparency variable suggests that 
more transparent or mature markets tend to have the lower cap rates.    
 
The semi-annual models in Panel B of Table 2 are run as a robustness check on the quarterly models.  
This is because, at a quarterly frequency, cap rates can display high levels of persistence.  Results for 
these models are strongly supportive of the patterns observed at a quarterly frequency, with all variables 
having the same signs and similar levels of significance.  
 
A similar modelling strategy is employed for turnover rates, the results of which are shown in Table 3.  
Models were estimated for the percentage turnover rate by value (models 1 to 4) and for the percentage 
turnover rate by floorspace (models 5 to 8).  The results for turnover rates are much less consistent and 
comprehensible when compared with the cap rate models. This is reflected in the lower explanatory 
power of the turnover rate models.  Indeed, in line with the pattern observed in Figure 3, it is notable 
that the turnover rate models have extremely low explanatory power when fixed effects are omitted.   
 
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
As before, two model specifications are presented for estimating the determinants of turnover rates, 
whether measured by value or by floorspace.  Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 incorporate city fixed effects.  Models 
2, 4, 6 and 8 introduce cross-sectional explanatory variables in place of the city fixed effects.  In all of 
the quarterly models, the coefficient on the US risk-free rate is positive and statistically significant.  
This is surprising since it would be expected that higher risk-free rates would be associated with lower 
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turnover.  However, this period may not be typical in that it was dominated by a recovery in transaction 
activity following the Global Financial Crisis and also characterised by falling US bond yields.  There 
is a fairly stable result for the country risk premium in the turnover rate models.  The coefficient for this 
variable is negative in all the models, albeit it is not significant in models 6 and 8.  As expected, the 
more risky a country’s government bonds are perceived to be relative to US bonds, the lower is the 
level of transaction activity, which is in line with the findings of Devaney et al (2017b) for a sample of 
European and Asia-Pacific real estate markets.  There is no consistent statistically significant result for 
the debt flow variable.  This takes a negative sign in the turnover rate models, which does not correspond 
with expectations that increases in credit stimulate transaction activity.   
 
The coefficient for the real rent trend deviation variable is not statistically significant when value-based 
turnover rates are examined.  However, in six out of eight models of floorspace-based turnover rate, it 
is statistically significant.  This may reflect increased trading of secondary space when rents are above 
long-term trend.  Meanwhile, the size variable is not in line with expectations as there is a significant 
negative coefficient for this variable.  This result is also in line with the findings of Devaney et al 
(2017b).  It is supportive of the argument that large, core cities have less transaction activity relative to 
their size which, whilst empirically unproven, has been explained as due to the increased propensity of 
core assets in core locations to be held longer within investment portfolios.  Perhaps surprisingly it is 
notable that the JLL Transparency score was found to have no significant impact on the turnover level.   
 
When the lagged residual cap rate variable is added to the specification, there are negligible changes to 
the coefficients and to the explanatory power of the models.  The coefficient for the cap rate variable is 
not statistically significant.  This suggests that, when purged of joint determinants, cap rates do not 
affect turnover rates.  Once again, for robustness, we present the results of estimations on semi-annual 
data in Panel B.  In this case, it is owing to concerns about ‘noise’ in quarterly turnover rates.  The 
results here are consistent with those for the quarterly estimations, albeit there is a higher level of 




A notable feature of the results is the stark differences between the explanatory power of the cap rate 
models and that of the turnover models when city fixed effects are omitted.  Market fundamentals such 
as bond yields, risk premiums, rental market conditions and amount of credit explain approximately 
65% of the variation in the cap rate variable.  In contrast, the comparable figure for turnover rates is 
1%-5%.  This suggests that any presumption that the same variables determine both prices and 




An association between changes in asset prices and transaction activity is a stylized fact in real estate 
research.  Complex causality relationships involving the interaction of market conditions, behavioral 
phenomena, debt availability, clientele effects and feedback effects between all these variables are 
considered to be jointly determining variations in transaction activity and asset price levels over time.  
A notable finding of the research is that, when purged of their joint determinants, there was no evidence 
to support the view that prices affect turnover rates or that turnover rates affect prices.   Cross-sectional 
variations in transaction activity and asset prices may also reflect differences in local institutional 
structures as well as market fundamentals.  Local institutional structures are expected to have impacts 
upon the propensity of market participants to transact due to differences in transaction costs and risks, 
which also have effects on asset prices.  As local institutional constructs, commercial real estate markets 
vary in terms of transfer taxes, time to transact, protection of property rights, and brokerage costs and 
arrangements.  The negligible explanatory power for the models of turnover rates with no city fixed 
effects suggests that it is local institutional factors that determine transaction activity. 
 
The empirical findings on cap rate determination are much stronger than the results for turnover rates.  
They are mostly in line with the results of previous research in terms of relationships with market 
fundamentals such as government bond yields, risk premiums and rental market conditions.  The finding 
of a negative relationship between market size and cap rate is consistent with a degree of spatial 
concentration of investment, investors, information and intermediaries in ‘core’ global real estate 
19 
 
markets.  All else equal, large markets are likely to be more transparent, and the expectation of a 
significant effect of market transparency on cap rates is confirmed.   
 
The strong association between transaction activity, prices and market conditions is particularly 
apparent from the spike in transaction activity during the commercial real estate price bubble of 2007 
and the subsequent plunge in values and volumes in 2008-09 as the global financial crisis took hold.  
Yet, in contrast to cap rates, the results for and patterns in turnover rates are inconsistent.  Whilst cities 
with high turnover rates tend to be in the US, Australia and UK, it is difficult to discern any notable 
patterns in markets with low transaction activity.  Perhaps surprisingly, many markets that might be 
regarded as relatively liquid by investors have below average turnover rates.  In some cases, this may 
be because assets in such cities are regarded as long-term holds by investors, with assets in second or 
third tier cities regarded as ‘cyclical’ or ‘rotational’ plays.  The results of formal econometric analysis 
support these insights.  In contrast to the cap rate variable, turnover rates tend to decrease with market 
size, while market transparency does not seem to have any impact. 
   
So, whilst the models for cap rates work fairly well at an international scale, it is clear that market 
fundamentals do not shed much light on the determinants of turnover rates.  It is possible that the macro-
differences in transaction activity reflect broader variations in forms of market economy and the 
different investment cultures that have evolved in different locations.  Whilst a binary classification 
may be too simplistic, the bottom half of the city rankings for turnover rates are dominated by 
economies that would be classified as following a Rhenish or coordinated market economy model.  The 
business culture in such markets, e.g. Munich, Paris, Tokyo, Rotterdam, is commonly characterized as 
“patient capitalism”.  The contrast here is with the Anglo-American liberal market economies that have 
more fragmented share ownership patterns, shorter performance horizons and deregulated markets.  It 
is the Anglo-American markets that dominate the upper half of the city ranking by turnover rate.  Studies 
drawing upon ‘Varieties of Capitalism Theory’ rather than market fundamentals may be more fruitful 
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Table 1: Ranking of cities according to turnover and volume – Q1 2007 to Q1 2015 
 
Average volume traded in USD 
billion p.a. 
Average turnover p.a. based on 
stock value (%) 
Average turnover p.a. 
based on sq. m. traded (%) 
      
London 23.9 Chicago 28.6 Seoul 21.1 
New York City 17.4 San Francisco 27.6 San Francisco 19.2 
Tokyo 15.7 Seoul 21.8 Chicago 18.6 
Paris 13.8 Beijing 17.1 Beijing 15.5 
Los Angeles 5.2 Sydney 14.7 Sydney 11.9 
Seoul 5.2 Melbourne 14.6 Melbourne 11.9 
San Francisco 5.0 Boston 14.3 Boston 10.7 
Sydney 4.4 Los Angeles 12.9 London 9.5 
Boston 4.4 Manchester 11.6 Manchester 9.4 
Chicago 4.3 London 10.1 Los Angeles 8.6 
Singapore 4.0 Washington DC 8.8 Shanghai 7.4 
Shanghai 3.9 Shanghai 8.6 Washington DC 7.4 
Frankfurt 3.9 New York City 7.7 Warsaw 6.3 
Beijing 3.6 Warsaw 7.5 New York City 5.9 
Stockholm 3.5 Frankfurt 6.8 Singapore 5.6 
Washington DC 3.3 Singapore 6.6 Frankfurt 4.4 
Moscow 3.1 Stockholm 6.3 Istanbul 4.3 
Hong Kong 3.0 Gothenburg 5.4 Moscow 3.9 
Munich 2.7 Moscow 5.2 Stockholm 3.9 
Melbourne 2.5 Amsterdam 4.3 Amsterdam 3.5 
Berlin 2.4 Rotterdam 4.0 Hong Kong 3.4 
Madrid 2.1 Tokyo 3.9 Osaka 3.2 
Osaka 1.6 Berlin 3.6 Barcelona 2.8 
Amsterdam 1.4 Barcelona 3.6 St Petersburg 2.6 
Warsaw 1.2 Munich 3.2 Paris 2.6 
Barcelona 0.8 Osaka 3.2 Madrid 2.5 
Manchester 0.8 Paris 3.2 Tokyo 2.4 
Rotterdam 0.6 Hong Kong 3.2 Berlin 2.3 
Gothenburg 0.6 Madrid 2.8 Rotterdam 2.3 
Lyon 0.6 Lyon 2.7 Munich 2.3 
Istanbul 0.2 St Petersburg 2.0 Lyon 2.1 
St Petersburg 0.2 Istanbul n/a Gothenburg 2.0 










Table 2: Panel models of office market cap rates – Q1 2007 to Q1 2015 
                    
Panel A: quarterly data Prime capitalisation rate   
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)     
Constant 3.557 *** 8.097 *** 3.460 *** 7.686 ***   
US govt bond yield 0.212 *** 0.331 *** 0.253 *** 0.341 ***   
Country risk premium 0.255 *** 0.545 *** 0.244 *** 0.666 ***   
Debt flow as % of GDP -0.009 *** -0.019 *** -0.006 *** -0.016 ***   
Real rent trend deviation -2.215 *** -2.141 *** -2.126 *** -2.214 ***   
Log(average floorspace) -   -0.505 *** -   -0.416 ***   
JLL transparency score -   0.463 *** -   0.187 **   
Lag residual - turnover -   -   -0.003   0.000     
City fixed effects YES   NO   YES   NO     
                    
Adjusted r-squared 87.6%   64.1%   87.1%   66.3%     
No of cities 33   33   31   31     
Observations 946   946   840   840     
Panel B: Semi-annual data Prime capitalisation rate   
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)     
Constant 3.526 *** 8.030 *** 3.344 *** 7.560 ***   
US govt bond yield 0.233 *** 0.335 *** 0.316 *** 0.375 ***   
Country risk premium 0.264 *** 0.566 *** 0.249 *** 0.700 ***   
Debt flow as % of GDP -0.010 *** -0.020 *** -0.006 ** -0.017 ***   
Real rent trend deviation -2.352 *** -2.213 *** -2.144 *** -2.212 ***   
Log(average floorspace) -   -0.484 *** -   -0.392 ***   
JLL transparency score -   0.408 *** -   0.092     
Lag residual - turnover -   -   0.001   -0.001     
City fixed effects YES   NO   YES   NO     
                    
Adjusted r-squared 87.5%   63.6%   87.6%   66.9%     
Cities 33   33   31   31     
Observations 505   505   442   442     
 






Table 3: Panel models of office market turnover rates – Q1 2007 to Q1 2015 
Panel A: quarterly data Value-based turnover rate Floorspace turnover rate   
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)     
Constant 1.149 *** 5.681 *** 1.208 *** 4.804 *** 1.688 *** 3.806 *** 1.460 *** 2.842 ***   
US govt bond yield 0.383 *** 0.288 ** 0.354 *** 0.333 ** 0.180 * 0.251 ** 0.252 ** 0.239 **   
Country risk premium -0.222 *** -0.073 * -0.214 *** -0.074 * -0.185 *** -0.031   -0.163 *** -0.028     
Debt flow as % of GDP -0.011   -0.018 ** -0.011   -0.016 * -0.011 * -0.016 ** -0.014 ** -0.016 **   
Real rent trend deviation 0.318   -0.470   0.499   0.173   1.757 *** 1.735 ** 1.424 ** 1.260     
Log(average floorspace) -   -0.446 *** -   -0.428 *** -   -0.259 *** -   -0.198 ***   
JLL transparency score -   -0.381   -   -0.071   -   -0.397 * -   -0.153     
Lag residual - cap rate -   -   0.030   0.020   -   -   -0.026   -0.029     
City fixed effects YES   NO   YES   NO   YES   NO   YES   NO     
Quarter dummies YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES     
                                    
Adjusted r-squared 38.6%   3.8%   32.5%   2.7%   34.5%   3.4%   35.9%   1.5%     
No of cities 31   31   31   31   33   33   33   33     
Observations 901   901   824   824   1031   1031   875   875     
Panel B: Semi-annual data Value-based turnover rate Floorspace turnover rate   
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)     
Constant 2.881 *** 10.49 *** 3.164 *** 11.30 *** 3.465 *** 6.870 *** 3.305 *** 7.421 ***   
US govt bond yield 0.590 ** 0.480 * 0.475 * 0.209   0.391 ** 0.585 ** 0.374 * 0.183     
Country risk premium -0.547 *** -0.175   -0.488 *** -0.152   -0.447 *** -0.075   -0.435 *** -0.060     
Debt flow as % of GDP -0.019   -0.038 * -0.017   -0.034   -0.022 * -0.036 ** -0.021   -0.031 *   
Real rent trend deviation 1.588   -0.386   1.348   -0.466   4.573 *** 4.377 ** 3.127 ** 2.079     
Log(average floorspace) -   -0.809 *** -   -0.794 *** -   -0.459 *** -   -0.410 ***   
JLL transparency score -   -0.474   -   -0.677   -   0.728   -   0.749     
Lag residual - cap rate -   -   -0.069   0.030   -   -   -0.200   -0.076     
City fixed effects YES   NO   YES   NO   YES   NO   YES   NO     
Half year dummy YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES     
                                    
Adjusted r-squared 48.7%   3.6%   51.2%   3.7%   48.4%   4.4%   56.7%   2.4%     
No of cities 31   31   31   31   33   33   33   33     
Observations 445   445   415   415   507   507   439   439     
Note: Robust standard errors are computed. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
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Amsterdam 5.5 -0.2 453 8,282 6,977 348 
Barcelona 5.6 -1.3 340 6,195 5,356 208 
Beijing 5.4 2.1 986 19,435 7,217 900 
Berlin 5.1 -0.1 352 6,998 17,686 590 
Boston2 5.1 0.0 388 7,416 9,418 1,092 
Chicago2 5.9 0.6 346 5,936 8,525 1,071 
Frankfurt 5.0 0.0 615 12,307 11,589 963 
Gothenburg 5.1 0.9 348 6,837 3,106 145 
Hong Kong 3.4 -0.3 2,462 75,906 5,971 745 
Istanbul 7.8 2.7 481 6,188 2,196 60 
London 4.2 -0.1 1,805 43,599 20,285 5,982 
Los Angeles2 5.4 -0.2 359 6,624 13,538 1,299 
Lyon 6.0 0.7 352 5,873 5,151 145 
Madrid 5.6 -1.5 484 8,850 11,940 531 
Manchester 6.0 -0.3 527 8,973 1,571 204 
Melbourne 6.6 0.3 440 6,652 4,141 627 
Moscow 9.4 0.4 1,149 12,652 11,681 763 
Munich 4.7 -0.1 506 10,698 20,675 678 
New York City2 4.8 0.1 639 13,449 35,045 4,356 
Osaka3 5.6 0.1 794 14,075 8,532 405 
Paris 4.6 -0.2 1,086 24,300 53,894 3,455 
Rotterdam 5.7 0.1 279 4,911 4,014 151 
San Francisco2 4.9 1.0 516 12,317 4,346 1,254 
Seoul 6.0 0.2 390 6,590 6,166 1,292 
Shanghai 5.1 -0.2 743 15,205 8,898 972 
Singapore 4.5 -0.3 1,215 27,264 4,636 995 
Sofia 9.1 -1.7 241 2,677 1,267 24 
St Petersburg 11.8 -2.3 872 7,773 2,072 42 
Stockholm 4.8 0.4 630 13,404 10,923 882 
Sydney 6.0 0.2 862 14,314 4,864 1,095 
Tokyo 4.3 -1.5 1,834 42,232 29,807 3,923 
Warsaw 6.1 0.0 438 7,195 3,524 294 
Washington DC2 5.2 -0.1 581 11,399 7,381 837 
Overall average1 6.1 -0.1 714 14,550 10,655 1,016 
 
1 Measured as the mean of all underlying observations, which does not equal the mean of figures in the table 
owing to some locations not having a complete set of observations for all variables. 2 Six-monthly observations 
for cap rate. 
 
 
